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1.  Introduction 
Ther·e  are three main  possible  sources of  economic  gain  arising 
fr·om  the  adoption  of  the  Internal  Market  Progr·amme:  increased 
specialization  in  accordance  with  the  law  of  comparative  advantage, 
changes  in  economic  efficiency brought  about  by  increased competition, 
and  increased  production  levels  due  to  a  better  exploitation of 
economies  of  scale made  possible  by  the  increase in  the size  of  the 
market. 
The  aim  of  the work  by  Muller  and  Owen  (1985)  is to analyze the 
1 ast  sour·ce.  More  precisely they consider  the effect of  trade on  the 
deviation  of  the representative plant size from  the minimum  efficient 
technical  scale  <METS>  at  the industrial  level. 
2.  Problems of  data and  specification 
In  our  analysis  for  Italy  we  have  followed  the  type  of 
specification proposed  by  Muller  and  Owen  <1985>.  The  sample  adopted 
consists of  14  industrial  sectors  (see  Appendix  A,  table A1>. 
The  sectors considered  in  the sample are only  14  because  of  the 
problem  of  matching  the  engineering  estimates  of  METS  with  the 
official  data  on  production,  trade  and  number  of  plants. 
A general  problem  with  this type  of  data is  the highly detailed 
disaggregation  with  which  METS  estimates are supplied.  We  have  adopted 
the highest  available disaggregation  level  <NACE  4  or  3  digits>. 
When  official  data were  more  aggregate  than  METS  estimates,  the 
implicit  assumption  was  that  these estimates are  representative for 
the whole  sector. -8-
Muller  and  Owen  define  their dependent  variable  as  the ratio 
between  CAPS  <the  average size of  the largest plants accounting  for  50 
percent  of  industry output>  and  METS. 
Such  definition,  although  pr·eferable  in  principle,  has  been  found 
to  be  inapplicable because  we  lack  physical  output  distributions by 
size of  plant for  most  industries.  The  problems  arise  in  variuos 
European  countries.  We  had  to redefine  the numerator  in  a  way  that 
corresponds  to available data. 
Our  first  choice was  the  average plant  size,  simply defined  as 
the ratio between  total  industry output  and  the number  of  plants in 
the industry.  The  results reported  in  Section  II,  2  are referred  to 
such  definition  of  the depe.ndent  variable  Cwe  called it:  DIMRL). 
The  independent  variables are: 
the  increase  in  unit  costs at  1/3  of  METS  <COST>; 
domestic  market  size,  measured  by  the ratio  between  domestic 
disappearance  and  METS  <SIZE>.  Domestic  disappearance  <or  apparent 
consumption>  is  defined  as  Production  +  Imports  - Exports 
- export  intensity measured  by  one  plus the ratio between  exports 
and  production  <ESP> 
import  penetration  measured  by  one  minus  the  ratio between 
imports  and  domestic  disappearance  CIMP>. 
All  the variables are  1982-83  averages. 
As  a  first step,  it is useful  to analyze  the correlation matrix 
<see  Table  1).  There is a  strong  positive correlation  between  relative 
plant dimension  CDIMRL)  and  domestic  market  size  <SIZE>  <r=0.79>. -9-
Tab.  1  - Co~relation matrix 
DIMRL  COST  SIZE  ESP  ESPEEC  IMP  IMPEEC 
DIMRL  1 
COST  0.10  1 
SIZE  0.79  -0.02  1 
ESP  0.55  -0.51  0.63  1 
ESPEEC  0.63  -0.40  0.64  0.87  1 
IMP  0.33  0.42  0.20  -0.06  -0.03  1 
IMPEEC  0.33  0.09  0.21  -0.12  -0.17  0.53  1 -10-
Relative plant  dimension  is also directly correlated with  export 
intensity  <r=0.55).  Further,  DIMLR  shows  a  very  low  positive 
correlation  with  import  penetration  <IMP>  and  a  negligible correlation 
with  the cost gradient  <COST). 
The  correlation  matrix  also gives us  some  information  about  the 
degree  of  multicollinearity among  our  variables.  The  evidence  in  Table 
1  suggests that multicollinearity is a  problem  in  our  sample:  there is 
a  high  positive correlation  between  relative domestic  market  size and 
export  intensity and  a  negative correlation between  the cost gradient 
and  export  intensity. 
This feature  of  our  sample  will  have  an  influence  on  our ability 
to disentangle the contribution  of  the  various  independent  variables 
in  the  .. explanation  ..  of  the  variance  of  the dependent  variable. 
J.  Regression  results 
The  results of  regres~ion analysis  are presented  in  Table  2.  We 
have  chosen  an  additive linear  specification with  all  the variables 
specified  in  their  natural  level.  In  eq.  2.1  all  estimated 
coefficients are,  as  expected,  positive.  The  positive  sign of  the 
import  penetration coefficient  corresponds  to  the 
11market  reducing 
effect..  hypothesis.  However,  only for  the market  size variable we  can 
reject  the hypothesis that  the coefficient is  zero  at  a  significance 
level  of  90%.  The  overall  explanatory power  of  the  regressione is 
good  for  a  cross-section analysis  <the  determination  coefficient is 
o. 69). - 11-
Tab.  2  - Regression  analysis of  determinants of  relative plant 
size*:  trade variables defined  on  a  world  basis. 
Dependent  variable:  DIMRL 
Constant  SIZE  COST  ESP  IMP  R2  adj-R2 
eq.  2.1  -0.219  0.003  0.002  0.149  0.073  0.69  0.56 
(-1.14)  <2.20)  (0.81)  ( 1. 03)  (0. 79) ! 
eq.  2.2  0.030  0.004  0.61  0.58 
( 1. 27)  (4.37) 
eq.  2.3  -0.486  0.004  0.369  0.090  0.53  0.39 
(-2.77>  ( 1. 43)  <2.97)  (0. 83) ! 
* Figures  in  brackets  ar·e  t-statistics 
F 
5.09 
19.13 
3.73 -12-
To  unde~stand  whethe~  multicollinea~ity c~eates  p~oblems  in  the 
inte~p~etation  of  the  ~esults,  it is useful  to  compa~e eq.  2.2  (in 
which  all  independent  va~iables but  SIZE  have  been  •xcluded)  and  eq. 
2.1.  If  the excluded  va~iables had  an  explicative power  independently 
f~om SIZE,  we  should  observe a  reduction  in  the adjusted  R-squa~ed of 
the  new  regression.  The  compa~ison of  the  two  regressions reveals that 
this is not  the case and,  hence,  that  in  our  model  all  the explicative 
power  is captured  by  the domestic  market  size  va~iable. 
This  in  not  to say that there  is a  lack  of  relationship  between 
the  othe~ independent  variables  and  relative  plant  size.  We  have 
already  noted  from  the  co~relation  mat~ix that there is,  for  example, 
a  relatively good  positive simple  cor~elation between  export  intensity 
and  relative plant  size.  Moreover,  eq.  2.3 shows  that  when  ~elative 
domestic  market  size is omitted  from  the analysis,  the  othe~  va~iables 
have  some  explanatory  power.  The  conclusion  is  that  va~iables like 
export  intensity explain  the same  portion  of  the  va~iance  of  the 
dependent  va~iable as domestic  ma~ket size;  in  other  wo~ds,  ESP  seems 
not  to  captu~e  elements  diffe~ent  from  those  already  taken  into 
conside~ation by  SIZE. 
4.  Fu~ther analysis 
The  conclusion  exposed  above  seems  to  be  in  contrast  with  the 
findings  of  Owen  <1983>  and  Muller  and  Owen  (1985>  concerning  the  ~ole 
of  export  performance  in  increasing  the  market  facing  the firm  through 
displacement  of  ma~ginal  competito~s in  the exporter's  own  indust~y. -13-
Tab.  3  - Regression  analysis of  determinants of  relative plant 
size*:  trade variables defined  on  a  EEC  basis. 
Dependent  variable:  DIMRL 
Constant  SIZE  COST  ESPEEC  IMPEEC  R2  adj-R2 
eq.  3.1  -0.743  0.002  0.004  0.429  0.013  0.79  0.70 
(-2.58)  ( 1. 48)  ( 1. 86)  (2.45)  (1.94)! 
eq.  3.2  -0.115  0.004  0.001  0.151  !  0.65  0.55 
(-0.72)  (3.96)  (0.60)  (0. 83) ! 
*  Figures  in  brackets are t-statistics 
F 
8.62 
6.33 -14-
In  order  to  explore the role  of  international  trade in  a  more 
complete way,  we  have substituted  the two  trade variables  <ESP  and 
IMP>  with  two  analogous  variables  constructed  on  the  basis of  trade 
flows  with  the  EEC  <ESPEEC  and  IMPEEC>.  The  results  <Table  3,  eq.3.1) 
show  a  clear  improvement  in  the explicative power  of  the regression 
(the determination coefficient rises from  0.69  to 0.79>.  What  is even 
more  relevant  is  the increased role  played  by  the two  new  trade 
variables;  their  estimated coefficients  are significantly different 
from  zero at  a  significance level  larger  than  901. 
A possible  explanation  of  this  result  lies  in  the different 
determinants  of  Italian foreign  trade  according  to  the different 
geographical  destination or  origin  of  trade flows.  More  precisely, 
intra-EEC trade,  being  mainly of  the intra-industry kind,  finds one  of 
its  determinants  in  economies  of  scale.  This  characteristic  is 
certainly  less  evident at  the  level  of  total  Italian  world  trade, 
since part  of  it  (especially  trade with  less developed  countries>  is 
explained  by  the 
between  eq.  2.1 
principle of  comparative 
and  eq.  3.1  stresses 
advantage.  The  comparison 
the  relationship  between 
relative plant size and  export  i.ntensity based  on  economies  of  scale. 
In  relation  to the other  independent  variables in  eq.  3.1, it 
should  be  noted  that the estimated coefficient  of  relative domestic 
market  size loses significance with  respect to eq.  2.1.  This is a  sign 
of  multicollinearity,  since in eq.  3.2,  where  the  ESPEEC  variable has 
been  omitted,  the significance level  of  the estimated  coefficient of 
SIZE  is substantially increased.  Moreover,  contrary to the results in 
Table 2,  the omission  of  ESPEEC  causes a  drop  in  the eKplicAtive power 
of  the regression  <the adjusted R-squared  falls from  0.70  to O.SS>. (3) 
-15-
Therefore,  the role  of  the export  variable is strengthened  in  our 
second  set  of  results,  implying  a  relationship  between  a  larger 
European  market  and  the size of  industrial  plants. 
5.  Elasticities 
Finally,  we  present  tha values of  the trade  elasticities.  These 
have  been  computed  at the average  level  of  the relevant  variables.  The 
elasticities  tell  us  the percentage  increase of  relative  plant  size 
when  the relevant  trade variable varies by  1  percent  (and  all  other 
independent  variables remain  constant). 
Computing  these elasticities both  for  eq.  2.1  <trade  flows  with 
the rest  of  the world)  and  for  eq.  3.1  (trade flows  with  the  EEC>  we 
obtain  the following  results: 
Trade  flows  with 
wor·ld 
(eq.  2. 1> 
EEC 
Ceq.  3. 1) 
elasticity relative to: 
export  intensity  import  intensity 
2.12  - 0.58 
5.45  - 3. 10 
Combining  these results and  assuming  balanced  gr·owth  in  trade 
flows,  so that  both  export  and  import  intensities grow  by  11,  relative 
plant size would  increase  by  1.541  when  we  consider  Italian trade with 
the  rest  of  the world,  and  by  2.351  when  we  consider  Italian trade 
with  the EEC. -16-
6.  Conclusions 
This  study has  analysed  the relationship  between  relative plant 
size and  a  set  of  variables comprising  relative domestic  market  size 
and  trade variables. 
The  results have  confirmed  the  importance  of  relative domestic 
market  size in  shaping  the extent  of  suboptimal  plant  capacity.  The 
trade variables,  when  defined  relatively to  Italian world  trade,  don't 
have  an  explicative role  independent  from  the  domestic  market  size 
variable.  However,  when  defined  relatively to  Italian trade with  the 
EEC,  they  tend  to assume  an  autonomous  role:  the extent  of  suboptimal 
plant  capacity  tends  to  be  inversely  correlated  to  the  Italian 
export  intensity with  the  EEC  and  directly  to  the  import  penetration 
from  the  EEC. -17-
Appendix  A - Data 
The  main  statistical  sources are: 
for  the  METS  estimates  :  Pratten  <1987> 
for  the number  of  plants  :  1981  Census  <ISTAT> 
for  production  data 
<ISTAT> 
Annuario  di  Statistiche Industriali 
for  trade variables:  Annuario  di  Commercia  Estero  <ISTAT>. 
The  sectors considered  are listed  in table A.1.  The  values of 
variables are reported  in table A.2. 
We  were  aware  of  a  major  weakness  connected  with  the  adoption  of 
the average plant  size as a  measure  of  the representative  plant  size: 
the  Census  provides us  with  a  number  of  plants which  is  greater  than 
the  number  which  can  be  considered  economically  meaningful.  For  this 
reason  we  have tried  a  first  rough  adjustment;  we  have  computed  the 
number  of  plants  in  which  are  enrolled  the  higher  901  of  the 
employees.  Similarly  we  have  taken  into  consideration  90%  of 
production  and  trade variables.  The  regression  results  relative to 
this set of  "adjusted"  variables are presented  in  Table  A.3,  where  the 
dependent  variable,  defined  as  indicated above,  is called  DIMRL1.  The 
results are not  very satisfactory:  the explanatory power  is lower  than 
that  of  the regressions in  Table  2  and  3  and  the coefficient  of 
relative domestic  market  size disappears. - 18-
Tab.  A.l  -List of  the sectors entering our  sample  (in brackets 
are the corresponding  NACE  Sroup): 
1.  Mineral  Oil  Refining  (140.1) 
2.  Steel  (221) 
3.  Cement  (242) 
4.  Blass bottles  (247.2) 
5.  F'aint  <255) 
b.  Ball  bearings  (326.2) 
.., 
I  •  T.V.  sets  (345.1) 
8.  Fridges  and  washing  machines  (346) 
9.  Cars  and  trucks  (351) 
10.  Bycicles  (363) 
11.  Beer·  brewing  (427) 
12.  Cigarettes  (429) 
13.  Leather·  shoes  (451) 
14.  Tyres  (481. 1) - 19-
Table  A.  2  - Values  of the variable 
-------------------------------------------------------------------- --------------------------------------------------------------------
obs  DIMRL  SIZE  COST  ESP  IMP 
-------------------------------------------------------------------- --------------------------------------------------------------------
1  0.076950  8.447546 
2  0.018320  4.887607 
3  0.199820  30.52772 
4  0.079192  12.62783 
5  0.031180  30.36715 
6  0.106839  1.031556 
7  0.001572  4.628425 
8  0.014728  11.24129 
9  0.019133  4.278750 
10  0.243052  17.22676 
11  0.120192  4.888236 
12  0.009375  4.988617 
13  0.369171  75.28520 
14  0.040928  1.870389 
-------------------------------- -~------------------------------ cbs  ESPEEC  IMPEEC 
-------------------------------- --------------------------------
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
1.071853 
1.052878 
1.000234 
1.102610 
1.080464 
1.175213 
1.194701 
1.192782 
1.231858 
1.338946 
1.002955 
1.005451 
1.531160 
1.004201 
0.959930 
0.931055 
0.998286 
0.957359 
0.822852 
0.792949 
0.768975 
0.988244 
0.596886 
0.973909 
0.909688 
0.922388 
0.939696 
0.994773  -------------------------------- ----------------------------~---
5.000000  1.203405 
10.00000  1.108328 
39.90000  1.013013 
11.00000  1.158928 
4.400000  1.322770 
9.000000  1.327744 
5.000000  1.307634 
9.700000  1.275459 
14.70000  1.354893 
4.000000  1.474682 
18.00000  1.007383 
3.000000  1.009719 
1.500000  1.841860 
7.500000  1.404775 
Tab.  A.3  -Regression results:  dependent  variable  DIHRL  1* 
0.732884 
0.902384 
0.994892 
0.944145 
0.757259 
0.686707 
0.274220 
0.992585 
0.541265 
0.941284 
0.878635 
0.238210 
0.697140 
0.729379 
-------------------------------------------------------------------
Constant  SIZE  COST  ESP  IMP  R2  adj-R2  F 
-0.657  -0.002  0.006  0.572  0.080  0.34  0.05  1.18  (-1.61)  (-0.78)  (1.12)  ( 1. 89)  (0.43) 
* Fig•Jres  i r.  bl"a,~kets  are t-statistics -20-
AppendiK  B - Discussion  of  the model 
The  approach  adopted  by  Muller  and  Owen  is derived  from  the work 
of  Scherer  et al.  (1975>.  They  try to explain  the differences between 
observed  and  optimal  plant  sizes  by  taking  into  consideration 
location  <theoretic)  variables,  market  size  variables  and  market 
imperfections variables.  All  the analysis relies on  the assumption 
that  plant/cost  curves  show  increasing  returns  up  to  some  minimum 
efficient scale,  and  constant  returns afterwards. 
Location  theoretic  variables 
Scher·er·  et  al.  <  1975> ·  show  that,  if unit  tr·ansport  costs are 
included  in  the standard  cost  minimizing  problem,  the  plant size 
chosen  will  be  greater  the less steep  is the  upward  slope of  the unit 
distribution cost  curve  and  the steeper  is the downward  slope  of  the 
unit  production  cost  curve. 
Assuming  evenly distributed  demand,  circular  markets  and  uniform 
costs of  shipping  one unit  of  output  one radial  mile,  it can  be  shown 
that  the  slope of  the unit  distribution cost  curve  incr·eases with 
freight  rates and  decreases  with  geographical  demand  density  and  with 
plant's share of  market. 
Hence  a  steeper  slope of  the unit  production  cost  curve,  lower 
transport  costs,  a  higher  demand  density,  and  a  higher  concentration 
<as  a  proxy  of  market  share>  bring  about  a  greater  relative plant 
size. -21-
Ma~ket size  va~iables 
Domestic  market  size  can  explain  why  plant  size  can  be  smaller 
than  METS  <minimum  efficient technical  scale>. 
First,  some  markets  may  be  too  small  to support  even  a  single 
plant  of  METS. 
Second,  even  if  a  small  market  is large enough  for  a  METS  plant, 
on  the demand  side the buyers  might  exhibit  a  preference for  having  at 
least  two  alternative  supply  sources.  The  rational  behind  this 
preference lies in  the security against  total  interruption  of  supplies 
and  in  the  "bar·gai ni ng  power·  conferr·ed  by  being  able  to  play  one 
pr·oducer  off  against  the other·". 
Thi r·d,  dynamic  consi der·ati ens  should  enter·  the analysis. "The 
smaller  the market  is  for  any  given  growth  rate,  the  more  time it 
takes  to  accumulate  a  demand  increment  sufficient  to  absorb  the 
capacity of  a  new  METS  plant". 
Moreover,  in  an  oligopolistic  market,  if  firms  attempt  to 
maintain  their  market  share  in  the face  of  a  limited  growth  in  demand, 
they  face  a  trade-off  between  carrying  excess  capacity  for·  a 
protracted  period  and  sacrificing  scale  economies.  They  would  be 
readier  to  carry excess  capacity  if  METS  is small  relative  to the 
market,  market  shares are  large,  and  demand  growth  is fast. 
Muller  and  Owen  <1985)  criticize the share maintenance  hypothesis 
(also  "spher·es  of  influence"  hypothesis)  when  refer·red  to European 
business,  claiming  that it  contradicts the observed  fast  growth  of 
intra-EEC trade.  In  fact  one  of  the implications  of  that  assumption 
is that  intra-EEC trade should  have  been  lower  in  those industries 
where  industrial  concentration  was  higher.  On  the  contrary,  Owen -n-
<1983>  found  that  intra-EEC trade for  most  manufacturing  industries 
was  weakly  positively  associated  to industrial  concentration.  As  a 
consequence,  according  to Muller  and  Owen,  seller concentration should 
not  enter as  an  explicative factor  in the dynamic  consideration. 
The  domestic  market  doesn't represent  the actual  market  facing 
the plant;  also the export  market  should  be  taken  into consideration. 
The  relationship  between  the export  market  and  relative  plant size 
is similar  to  that  between  domestic  market  and  plant  size.  In 
addition,  however,  Owen  (1983>  and  Muller  and  Owen  C1985)  stress 
that,  if  an  aggressive  business  behavior  is  assumed,  export 
performance  has  an  influence on  the displacement  of  smaller  plants in 
the exporting  industry and  not  only  in  the  importing  one.  The  idea is 
based  on  the  observation  that,  in  a  given  industry,  plants of 
different size coexist.  This  may  be partly explained  by  the costs of 
driving  out  smaller  high  cost  competitors;  these costs are determined 
"by  the short  term  penalties which  arise  from  the  need  to operate 
larger  capacity at  below  full  utilization during  the period  prior to 
the withdr·awal  of  the  high  cost competitor,  more  especially if the  low 
cost  competitor  feels it  necessary to  reduce  prices  prior  to the 
retirement  of  the smaller  competitor"  COwen  (1983>,  p.lB>.  On  the 
other  side  of  the balance,  there are  "the additional  profits which 
will  accrue  to the  larger,  low  cost  producer  over  the life  of  its 
plant  as  a  result  of  driving  out  smaller  competitors".  The 
opportunities offered  by  international  trade raise  the expected  gains 
of  predatory actions:  as  a  consequence  the marginal  producer  becomes 
more  vulnerable in  both  the export  and  the domestic  market. (4~ 
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Import  penetration  may  have,  on  an  apriori  ground,  two 
contrasting effects.  On  the one  hand,  imports  may  spur  firms  to build 
plants of  efficient size  to meet  or  beat  competition.  On  the other· 
hand,  imports  may  indicate sectors in  which  a  country has comparative 
disadvantage. 
Tariffs  might  have  a  residual  role  in  explaining  suboptimal 
plants.  In  this case a  negative  relationship  between  tariff levels 
and  relative plant scale is predicted. 
A further  element  connected  with  market  size,  is the diversity of 
plant's output  mix.  As  underlined  by  Caves et  al.  (1980)  and  by 
Baldwin  and  Gorecki  <1986),  if the market  for·  a  particular  prod_uct 
limits  a  specialized plant  to  suboptimal  scale,  a  possible response 
for  the manager  is to diversify the plant's output  mix. 
The  importance of  consider·ing  this element  stems  both  from  recent 
developments  in  the theory  of  industrial  organization  <which  specify 
rigorously the conditions under  which  production  of  many  products  in 
one plant  is more  efficient than  production  in  many  plants>  and  by  the 
fact  that  firm's  decisions as to the number  of  products,  length  of 
production  run  and  number  of  plants  are  taken  jointly. 
Unfortunately,  with  the exception  of  Baldwin  and  Gorecki  (1986),  most 
of  the empirical  literature  has  only  taken  into  consideration  the 
plant size dimension. 
Principal  Results 
The  regression  analysis performed  by  Scherer et al.  is based  on  a 
pooled  sample of  12  sectors and  6  countries with  data referring to the 
mid-sixties. -24-
An  idea  of  the results they  obtained  for  the pooled  sample is as 
follows: 
TOP  50  = 
METS 
.59 SIZE+  .14  COST- .17 TRANS- .07 DENS+  .82 M53 
( • 41)  ( • 11>  ( • 06)  ( • 06)  ( • 1  0) 
+  .13  <1-IMPORT>  +  3.78  Cl+EXPORT> 
(. 18)  (. 86) 
Call  variables  in  log> 
<standard  errors  in  parentheses)  R2=.81 
where  Top  50  =  average size of  the  largest plants accounting  for  50% 
of  industry employment  or  output,  METS  = minimum  efficient tecnical 
scale,  SIZE  = ratio of  domestic  disappearance to the estimated  METS, 
COST  = percentage  by  which  unit  cost rises building at  1/3 METS,  TRANS 
=  transport cost  per  dollar  of  product  value,  DENS  =  product  of 
adjusted  population densities and  the  indices of  real  national  income 
per  capita,  MS3  =  three firm concentration ratio,  IMPORT  =  ratio of 
imports  to domestic  consumption,  EXPORT  =  exports as a  percentage  of 
domestic  production. 
International  and  interindustry variations  in  relation  to  METS 
are  associated  with  market  size,  sales concentration  and  a  set of 
variables reflecting  the cost  minimising  decisions  of  firms serving 
spatially dispersed  markets. 
From  these results two  possible  contrasting  indications arise. 
On  one side,  the positive and  significant estimated coefficient of  MS3 
(seller  concentration  measure>  might  be  consistent  with  the market 
share maintainance  hypothesis.  On  the other side,  as noted  by  Owen 
C1983,p.31>  and  by  Muller-Owen  (1985>  the elasticity of  the dependent 
variable  with  respect  to  export  performance  was  nearly four:  this 
high  figure  cannot  be  explained  by  export  performance alone.  It is -25-
suggested  that  this  figure  is consistent  with  aggressive business 
behaviour·:  "The  sensitivity of  the change  in  representative plant 
size to export  performance could  only  have  been  accounted  for  by  the 
displacement  of  smaller  plants in  the exporter's  own  industry,  taking 
place  at  the  same  time  as  the  dr·ive  towar·ds  export  mar·kets" 
(Muller-Owen,  p.48> 
It is difficult  from  this  type of  analysis  to distinguish  among 
these  competing  hypothesis. 
Muller  and  Owen  repeat  the same  type of  analysis for  West  Germany 
alone.  They  don't  take  into  consideration  any  location  theoretic 
var· i abl es.  Moreover  assuming  aggressive  business  behaviour,  they 
don't  consider  any  concentration  measure. 
For  1965  the result of  their regression  on  the basis of  a  sample 
of  12  industries are: 
TOP  50  = -0.22  +  .60 SIZE  +  0.43  COST  +  1.44  (1  +  EXPORT>  + 
METS  <6.31>  <1.34)  <1.13> 
+  1.84  <1  - IMPORT> 
(. 82) 
Call  variables  in  log> 
<t  - ratios in  parentheses)  R2=.86 
Problems  of  multicollinearity create difficulties  in  identifying 
the role of  all  independent  variables with  the exception  of  SIZE. 
In  a  separ~te  regression  with  only  two  indipendent  variables 
<SIZE  and  EXPORT>  the export  performance  measure  is significant. 
The  same  analysis is  repeated for  1980. 
with  METS  at  1980  level  is: 
The  regression results -M-
TOP  SO  = -3.48 +  .59 SIZE  - .33 COST  +  6.58  (1  +  EXPORT>  + 
METS  <6.16)  <-1.08>  <3.89) 
+1.21  (1  - IMPORT> 
(5.01) 
<all  variables  in  log> 
<t  - ratios  in  parentheses)  R2=.79 
In  this  case  the multicollinearity problem  seems  less severe: 
both  domestic  and  foreign  markets effect are positive.  The  effect of 
imports  on  plant  size  suggests  that  the  market  reducing effect 
dominates the competitive pressure effect. 
At  this  stage  of  the  analysis  Muller  and  Owen  perform  a 
simulation  and  compute  the difference between  the actual  average plant 
size in  the  sample  in  1980  and  the plant size that  one  would  expect  in 
case the  EXPORT  and  IMPORT  variables  had  remained  equal  to their 
values.  The  result  suggests that trade had  the  effect  of  doubling 
plant size,  and  that  the gains  in efficiency were  equivalent  to 201  of 
the original  increase in  trade. 
Some  considerations 
The  description  above  suggests us  to  illustrate some  weaknesses 
of  this type  of  empirical  exercise. -27-
First,  as we  have  already noted,  there is no  strong  theoretical 
background  to these exercises.  However  this is a  general  problem  with 
most  of  the  empirical  exercises  in  the  field  of  industrial 
organisation. 
Second,  the elements of  theory available suggest  no clear causal 
link  between  two  variables.  An  example  is  the relationship between 
concentration  and  relative plant size.  It can  be  held  that the causal 
link  goes  from  concentration to  relative  plant  size.  However, 
there is a  large  body  of  literature  suggesting that plant size  is a 
determinant  of  concentration. 
In  the empirical  exe~cises,  the possibility of  a  bias  in  the 
estimated coefficient  caused  by  this  double causation  link,  shoul  be 
evaluated. 
Similar  problems  arise for  the causation  link  between  relative 
plant size and  export  intensity. 
Third,  as already mentioned,  most  of  the studies don't  consider 
that  a  firm  takes  joint  decisions regarding  the number  of  products, 
the  length  of  production  runs  per  product  and  multiplant  operations. 
This  a  source of  possible misspecification of  the relationship to be 
estimated. 
Finally,  the use  of  engineering estimates of  economies  of  scale 
is probably the best  approach  to measure  economies  of  scale;  however, 
for  their nature,  they  impose  a  lot of  constraints on  the availability 
of  a  representative sample  of  industries.  For  example  Scherer et al. 
<  1975)  adopted  a  sample  of  8  only sectors and  Muller·  and  Owen  ( 1985) 
adopted  a  sample of  only  12  sectors. -28-
Furthermore,  the  low  number  of  observations  relative  to the 
number  of  independent  variables,  reduces 
freedom,  creating  inferential  problems. 
the  number  of  degrees  of 
All  the weakness  described  are common  to  the body  of  economic 
literature  existing  on  the topic  we  are dealing  with.  There is no 
short  and  easy  way  out  of  them:  only the gradual  improvement  in  the 
general  availabilitu of  basic  informatiom will  help.  In  the meantime, 
we  have  perfomed  our  exercise,  providing  some  evidence.  We  feel  great 
caution is  needed  in  interpreting our  results,  as  well  as  those of 
simi 1  ar·  studies. -~-
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1.  The  approach  adopted 
Our  analysis could  stop  here.  However,  there are two  reasons for 
adding  a  few  paragraphs. 
In  the first place,  we  have  expr·essed  motives for  great  caution 
in  interpreting the Muller-Owen  results;  furthermore,  our  application 
of  the Muller-Owen  approach  to  Italy has  been  severely  limited  by  the 
scarcity of  the data available. 
In  the  second  place,  recent  literature expresses  the opinion  that 
scale economies at  the plant  level  are less  important  than  ~elieved 
previously.  The  relevant  economies  of  scale and  scope  in  the  large 
corporation  are to  be  found  mainly  in  R&D  and  in the distribution 
business  (including  advertising>;  possibly  also  in  finance.  This 
belief  moves  the  core  of  the  argument  in  favour  of  trade 
liberalization from  the traditional  variables  examined  by  Muller-Owen 
and  by  us  to a  much  larger set  of  variables. 
We  are not  here  in  condition  to tackle such  a  larger  view  of  the 
benefits from  integration.  On  the other  side,  even  the  narrow  view  of 
economies  of  scale  in  production  has  a  widely  variable validity among 
sectors.  In  a  few  sectoral  cases,  where  non-tariff  barriers have  been 
maintained  at  a  very  high  level,  the effects of  trade liberalization 
can  be quite  important.  This is mainly  the case  of  sectors dominated 
by  public  procurement.  We  have  gathered  some  additional  information  on 
three  such  sectors:  pharmaceuticals,  telecommunications equipment, 
railways  equipment. 
The  general  conclusions  from  the three short sectoral  studies are 
the following: -32-
the sectors considered  show  peculiar signs  of  weakness  with 
respect  to the rest  of  Italian industry  and  to the  same  sectors in 
other  countries, 
such  weakness  is  somehow  related to  the role  played  by  the 
public authorities in controllind demand, 
and  goes  with  fragmentation  at  the firm  level,  sometimes also 
at  the plant  level. -33-
Pharmaceutical  products 
1.  Introduction 
In  Italy,  like in  other countries,  the government  has played  an 
active  role  in  both  the  supply  and 
pharmaceutical  industry. 
the  demand  side  of  the 
On  the supply  side,  the  areas of  government  intervention are 
mainly related to the controls over  introduction  of  new  products,  the 
controls over  drug  prices and  the attitude towards  patent  protection. 
On  the demand  side,  the  government  is  the largest  buyer  of 
pharmaceutical  products. 
Before considering  these two  aspects,  we  introduce syntetically a 
picture of  the pharmaceutical  industry in  Italy. 
2.  Dimension  and  internationalization  1  some  evidence 
In  relation  to the  size distribution,  in the period  1971-1981 
there is an  increase of  17.11  in  the representative  (1)  plant size and 
of  5.41 in  the representative firm size. 
Among  the dimensional  classes,  the largest relative increase  is 
observed  in  the class from  from  500 to 999  employees,  while there is a 
decrease  in  the percentage  of  employees  in  the  largest dimensional 
class  <table  1>. 
The  top  50S  index  shows  an  increase of  9.5S at  the plant  level 
and  a  decrease of  7.7S at the firm  level. -34-
For  an  international  comparison  the available  data are referred 
to firms  with  more  than  20  employees.  Table  2  shows  that  in  1981  the 
average  firm  dimension  was  smaller  in  Italy  than  in  the United 
Kingdom,  in  West  Germany  and  in  Danemark;  it was  similar to the one  in 
France  and  larger  than  in  Belgium. 
While  technical  scale  economies  ar·e  irrelevant  in  the 
pharmaceutical  industry,  firm  level  scale  economies  in  R-D 
activities  and  marketing  activities)are  important.  As  a  consequence 
the evidence  that  aver· age  f i r·m  dimension  is  1  ower·  in  Italy th.,.,  in  two 
of  the  lead1ng  countries  can  be  interpreted as  a  signal  that  Italian 
firms  do  not  reach  Qn  average  an  optimal  dimension. 
In  relation to the internationalization,  we  first  consider  the 
role of  foreign  direct  investment. 
In  1986  the share of  foreign  controlled  firms  in  the  Italian 
finished  drug  market  was  58.5%  <table 3).  It  increased  in  the last  few 
years,  but  it has  not  yet  reached  the  level  it had  in  1975. 
The  importance  of  foreign  capital  in  terms  of  market  share is 
high  in  almost  all  developed  countries  (for  example,  in  U.K.  it is 65% 
and  in  France  50%). 
What  differentiates  Italy from  other  developed  countries  is the 
low  profile of  Italian production  abroad:  the share of  major  world 
markets  held  by  Italian companies is lower  than  one  percentage.point, 
except  in  such  markets  as Spain,  Brazil  and  Argentina  <table  4>. 
Foreign  trade is  not  very  important  for  Italian pharmaceutical 
industry.  In  1985  export  intensity  <measured  as the ratio between  the 
value  of  exports  and  the  value  of  sales>  was  18.41  and  import 
penetration  (measured  as  the ratio  between  the value of  imports  and 
domestic  disappearance>  was  21.41  <Table  5>.  When  we  consider  only -35-
finished  drugs,  the  two  ratios  are even  lower  (14.1  the former  and 
16.6  the latter)  even  if they  shows  an  increase with  respect  to their 
1975  level. 
For  a  comparison  with  other  developed  countries we  consider  data 
for  1982  in table 6  (2). 
Export  intensity  of  the  italian  pharmaceutical  industry  is 
clearly lower  than  the average  for  the  EEC  <15.8%  compared  to 31.7%). 
Such  a  gap  is  not  observed  for  import  penetration  (in  Italy  it is 
15.0%  and  on  average  in the  EEC  it is 21.8%>. 
In  summary,  Italian pharmaceutical  industry,  with  respect  to 
other  advanced  countries,  has  a  lower  average  firm  dimension,  and 
lower  values for  export  intensity and  production  abroad. 
The  two  aspects are likely  to  be  related,  and  to be at least 
partially due  to a  peculiar  behaviour  of  the public authorities. 
J.  Public  eKpenditure 
Up  to the  end  of  the seventies there has been  a  continue  increase 
in  the public  component  of  pharmaceutical  expenditure.  More  precisely 
public  expenditure for  prescription  drugs  sold  in  pharmacy  <which 
account  for  the largest part  of  total  consumption>  has continuosly 
increased  its share of  total  expenditure  up  to  1978;  after that  year 
the share has  remained  approximately costant. -36-
The  incidence of  Italian  pha~maceutical  public  expenditu~e on  GOP 
was,  in  1986,  0.781:  this  figu~e is  lowe~ than  the one  fo~  F~ance 
(0.951)  and  West  Ge~many  (0.941>,  but  highe~  than  the  one  fo~ U.K. 
(o.S4S>  <Table  8).  Moreove~ in  Italy it is decreasing  after  1975, 
while  in  the  othe~ three countries  the~e is an  inc~easing t~end. 
In  Italy,  similarly to  other  count~ies,  a  new  pha~maceutical 
product  requi~es an  official  approval.  In  general,  a  new  drug  has  to 
pass a  test concerning its safety and  its effectiveness. 
When  compared  to those of  other  advanced  countries,  in  Italy the 
standa~ds ~equired to pass the registration test  have  been  ve~y low. 
However,  in  the last  few  years  there  has  been  an  unofficial 
adoption  of  the  EEC  standards. 
Generally,  after  a  product  has obtained official  approval,  firms 
wait  for  its admission  in the Prontuario Terapeutico  Nazionale  <PTN>, 
i.e.  the list  of  products that  the doctor  can  prescribe within  the 
framework  of  the Servizio  Sanitaria Nazionale  [SSN,  i.e.  National 
Health  Servi eel. 
In  theory,  the  admission  to  PTN  is  an  instrument  for  the 
government  to control  the composition  of  public  expenditure.  However, 
almost  all  the products that  obtain  the registration are also included 
into PTN;  being  the selectivity of  the registration very  low,  the PTN 
becomes  an  unexploited  instrument  for  that  objective. 
One  consequence of  this state of  affai~s is  that  in  1981  3/4 of 
public  consumption  for  finished  d~ugs is  for  product  classified as 
"less effective"  (i.e.  the second  group>  in  the  PTN  <Table  9). 
This  lack  of  selectivity has clearly  favoured  national  firms, 
which  have  been  char·acterized  by  a  low  innovative  content  of  their· 
p~oduction. (6) 
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Two  other  factors  have  favoured  the  maintenance  of  this 
situation.  Firstly,  until  1978,  in  Italy there has  been  an  absence  of 
patent  pr·otection.  Secondly,  the  regime  of  administrative prices has 
not  been  qualitatively  selective;  the methodology  adopted  in setting 
prices didn't  take  into  consideration  the  innovativeness  and  the 
therapeutic  value of  the product.  After  1978,  the  new  system  included 
allowances  for  research contents of  new  products. 
The  approach  adopted  has  been  to  favour  the  R-D  activities 
localized  in  Italy:  in  setting the price  an  increase  of  12%  is 
recognized  for  innovative contents to firms  which  have  R-D  activities 
in  Italy,  while  an  increase  of  101  is accorded  to firms  with  R-D 
activities located  abroad. 
All  these  elements  underline  that,  while  government  attitude 
favoured  national  companies,  this didn't  happen  within  a  framework  of 
industrial  policy aimed  at strengthening  the ability of  Italian firms 
to compete  on  international  markets. 
Even  if  in  1978  there has  been  some  indication of  change  in 
government  attitude,  in  1981  the largest share of  drugs  produced  by 
Italian firms  was  composed  of  products  belonging  to the  second  gr·oup 
of  PTN;  on  the contrary,  foreign  firms  had  their  production  mainly 
composed  by  the more  innovative products belonging  to  the first group 
of  PTN  (Table  10>. 
Italian firms  don't  have  R-D  laboratories  able  to  produce  a 
sufficient  number  of  new  products with  some  innovative content.  This 
is a  consequence  of  the delay with  which  some  Italian firms started to 
devote resources to R-D  activities  during  the  70's.  The  introduction -38-
in  1978  in  Italy of  patent  p~otection,  ~equired a  change  of  strategy 
by  Italian firms.  For  this reason  Italian firms started to  look  for 
products to sell  unde~ license. 
The  results of  a  resea~ch conducted  by  Irs in  1983  on  the basis 
of  firm  interviews,  show  that  in  1975  only  321  of  innovative products 
sales by  Italian firms  we~e based  on  innovations developed  by others 
and  that  in  1981  that  pe~centage rose to 611.  There are many  reasons 
that  c~eate  an  incentive for  the multinational  firms  to  sign  these 
ag~eements.  First,  it is not  true that  two  or  mo~e  sellers share a 
static  market.  In  fact  the summation  of  more  marketing  strategies 
produces  an  expansion  of  unespected  dimension  in  consumption.  This 
outcome  is  also  one  of  the reasons  behind  the  "cross-licensing" 
phoenomenon  at  inte~national  level.  Second,  the  licensing agreement 
is in  some  cases,  just a  first step  in  a  merger  process.  Finally,  but 
not  less  important,  Italian firms  have  a  better  knowledge  of  the 
Italian  ma~ket so that  they  a~e more  able  to speed  up  the successful 
introduction  of  a  new  product. 
4.  Final  comments 
Although  the  pharmaceutical  industry  is  not  subject  to public 
procu~ement,  the  gove~nment relied  on  other  instruments to protect  the 
domestic  i ndustr·y:  regi str·ati  on  of  new  drug,  admission  to 
prescription  within  the National  Health  System,  patent  recognition 
and  price  cont~ols. -39-
While  economies  of  scale at  the plant  level  a~e  ve~y  low,  the 
abolition  of  ba~riers  can  increase  firm  size.  This can  favour  an 
increase  in  the  number  of  specialised  R-D  laboratories,  possibly 
bearing  an  increase  in  the amount  and  productivity  of  innovative 
expenditure. 
It is not  clear  how  Italian firms,  with  their actual  inability to 
compete at  an  international  level,  can  exploit  the potential  gains of 
a  less fragmented  European  market. 
On  the  cont~ary,  the question  is whether  Italian firms  will  still 
be  able to conclude  license  ag~eements with  foreign  multinationals  in 
a  market  characterized  by  a  f~ee  access to information  and  by  more 
impartial  registration systems. 
Notes 
<1>  Defined  as the Florence median  or  Midpoint  plant.  This  measure 
(2) 
is the  median  of  the first  moment  distribution  <i.e.  it measures 
the dimension  of  the plant  which  divides the population  so that 
half  of  the employment  comes  from  larger  and  half  from  smaller 
plants>. 
The  figures  presented  in  table 5  and  in 
comparable  because of  the different  definitions 
industry). 
table  6  are not 
of  the relevant :I 
-40-
Tab.  1  - Manufacture  of  pharmaceutical  products  <NACE  257> 
Size distribution:  plants and  firms 
1971  1981 
---------------------------- ------------------------------
Employees  Plants  Employees  Plants 
N.  I  N.  I  N.  ' 
N.  ' 
1 - 5  6""'""  .::t  1.0  219  25.7  602  .9  213  27.4 
6  - 9  731  1. 2  102  11.9  659  1.0  90  11.7 
10-19  2126  3.5  153  17.9  1322  2.0  96  12.3 
20-49  4854  8.0  157  18.4  4443  6.8  137  17.5 
50-99  5377  8.9  79  9.2  6464  9.9  92  11.7 
100-199  9035  14.9  62  7.2  8362  12.8  58  7.4 
200-499  19307  31.8  61  7.1  18887  28.9  63  8.0 
500-999  12156  20.0  17  2  19894  30.4  28  3.6 
mor·e  than  1000  6467  10.7  5  .6  4763  7.3  3  .4 
TOTAL  60680  855  65396  100.0  783  100.0 
M=71.0  Me=317.5  Top50%=514  M=83.5  Me=371.7  Top50%=562.8 
1971  1981 
---------------------------- ------------------------------
Employees  Firms  Employees  Fi r·ms 
N.  %  N.  I  N.  I  N.  % 
1 - 5  415  .6  134  21.4  313  .4  95  18.4 
6  - 9  536  .8  75  12.0  4""'"""  "'' 
.6  58  11.2 
10-19  1460  2.2  104  16.6  1040  1. 5  75  14.4 
20-49  3913  5.8  131  20.9  3170  4.6  97  18.7 
50-99  3979  5.9  61  9.8  4779  7.0  69  13.3 
100-199  609()  9. 1  43  6.9  6052  8.8  43  8.3 
200-499  15892  23.8  50  8.0  16006  23.3  50  9.6 
500-999  10462  15.7  15  2.4  15504  22.6  22  4.2 
mor·e  than  1000  24079  36.0  12  1. 9  21413  31.2  10  1.9 
TOTAL  66826  625  68704  100.0  519  100.0 
M=106.9  Me  =554.0  TopS0%=1315.5  M=132.4  Me=583.9  Top501=1213.8 
M  =  average size 
Me  =  Florence Med1an 
Top  50S  =  average size of  the  largest  plants  (firms) 
covering  50S  of  the employees 
Source  !STAT,  Census -41-
Tab.  2  - Manufacture  of  pharmaceutical  pr·oducts  <NACE  257>  - 1981 
International  comparison  of  size distributions:  fi  r·ms 
Employees 
I 
20-99 
Italy  8.9 
West  Ber·many  n.a 
Fr·ance  9.6 
Belgium  15.3 
United  Kingdom  4.7 
Denmark  5.0 
Fir·ms 
Italy  51.2 
West  Ger·ma.ny  n.a 
Fr·ance  45.6 
Belgium  60.8 
United  Kingdom  42.9 
Denmark  41.2 
Note:  M = average  firm size 
Source  :  Eurosta.t 
I 
100-499 
34.6 
n.a 
44.8 
34.1 
16.6 
24.4 
36.6 
n.a 
41.8 
29.4 
34.3 
35.3 
I  N. 
mor·e  than  500  Total 
56.6  64336 
67.7  86376 
45.7  63205 
50.6  9960 
78.7  68432 
70.6  7229 
12.2  254 
13.7  270 
12.6  261 
9.8  51 
22.9  140 
23.5  17 
M 
253.3 
319.9 
242.2 
195.3 
488.8 
Jl25.2 -42-
Tab.  3  - Share of  domestic  market  controlled  by foreign  capital 
CS  sales of  finished  drugs> 
1975  1984  1985 
It  al  ~'  63.9  56.0  57.1 
France  46.2 
West  Germany  31.8 
United  Kingdom  63.0 
USA  21.6 
( 1)  1985 
Sour-ce:  Far·mi ndustri a, 
11 Indicator  i  Farmaceuti c i 
11 
Tab.  4  - Mar-ket  shar-e  of  italian firms  in  some  for-eign  countr-ies 
Mar·ket 
West  Germany 
France 
United  Kingdom 
Spain 
USA 
Canada 
Japan 
Brasil 
Ar·genti na 
Messico 
Sour·ce  ,:  Luciani  (1983) 
1973 
.2 
• 1 
• 1 
2.7 
4.6 
n.a 
2.7 
1983 
.8 
.2 
.3 
3.5 
.4 
.2 
3.4 
2.3 
n.a 
1986 
58.1 
so.o 
35.0 
65.0 
( 1) 22.0 -43-
Tab.  5  - Exposure to international  competition 
Total  Finished  Drugs 
1985  1986  1975  1985 
Export  Intensity  18.4  17.0  8.8  14.1 
Import  penetration  21.4  22.0  9.1  16.6 
Source  :  our  elaborations from  data  in  Farmindustria, 
"Indicatori  Farmaceutici" 
Tab.  6  - Exposure  to international  competition 
Italy 
Ger·many 
UK 
Fr·ance 
EEC 
expor·t 
intensity 
1982 
15.8 
30.4 
37.9 
23.8 
31.7 
i mpor·t 
penetr·at ion 
1982 
15.0 
19.5 
19.0 
12.3 
21.8 
Source  our  elaboration  from  data  in  Burstall  (1985> 
1986 
11.9 
16.7 -44-
Tab.  7  - Private and  public  expenditure of  prescription 
drugs  in  pharmacy 
1965 
1975 
1978 
1979 
1980 
1982 
Sour·ce 
Total 
expenditure 
<billions lire) 
473 
1539 
2224 
2474 
3190 
5150 
Luc i on i  <  1  986  > 
Public 
exp. 
60.9 
64.7 
80.7 
75.8 
82.0 
83.6 
Tab.  8  - Incidence of  pharmaceutical  public 
expenditure on  BDP  (~) 
Private exp. 
I 
ticket 
3.7 
11.3 
9.9 
7. 1 
out  of 
the pocket 
39.1 
35.3 
15.6 
13.5 
8.1 
9.3 
Italy  France  West  Germany  U.K. 
1965  .74  .83  .46  .41 
1970  .79  .84  .66  .41 
1975  .91  .89  • 86  .43 
1980  .67  .77  .84  .50 
1985  .86  .90  .90  .53 
1986  .78  .95  .94  .54 
Sour·ce  Far·mi ndustr·i a -45-
Tab.  9  - Composition  of  public  consumption  for  finished  drugs 
Share of  products 
- belonging  to 
I  group 
- belonging  to 
II  group 
Sour·ce  Luci oni  ( 1983) 
1978 
18.8 
81.2 
1979  1980  1981 
21.2  23.7  25.0 
78.8  76.3  75.0 
Tab.  10  - Analysis  of  sales according  to nationality of 
firms  and  to groups of  PTN  - 1981 
Share of  products 
sold  belonging  to 
- I  gr·oup 
_  II  group 
Source  :  Lucioni  (1983> 
Italian 
fi  r·ms 
38.7 
61.3 
Foreign 
firms 
22.7 
77.3 -46-
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Telecommunications  Equipment 
1.  Introduction 
It is widely  recognized  that  in  Italy there is  a  fragmented  and 
overlapping set of  telecommunications  institutions. 
The  government  has  a  legal  monopoly  of  the provisions  of  basic 
network  services.  Actually,  the services are provided  in  part directly 
by  the Ministry  of  Posts  and  Telecommunications  <PT>  and  partly by 
licensed  private,  but  government-owned,  companies  (SIP,  Italcable and 
Telespazio>. 
The  distribution  of  duties among  the various firms  reveals a  very 
complicated  structure. 
organizations,  each 
Within  the Ministry of  PT  there  are  two  main 
one  with  its  own  budget.  The  Posts  and 
Telecommunications  Administration  provides all  domestic  and  part  of 
the  international  telegraph  and  telex  services;  the ASST  <Azienda  di 
State  per  i  Servizi  Telefonici>  provides  international  telephone 
services with  all  European  and  part  of  the Mediterranean  countries;  it 
also  handles  the domestic  trunk  services  between  37  districts.  The 
largest  licensee,  SIP,  provides all  local  telephone services and  part 
of  the  domestic  trunk  services.  Italcable  handles  international 
telegram services  and  intercontinental  telephone,  telegram  and  telex 
services.  Finally,  Telespazio provides the installation and  operation 
of  the ground  equipment  of  telecommunication  via satellite. -48-
2.  Public  procurement 
From  a  technical  point  of  view  only the purchasing  activities of 
the government-owned  firms  should  be  considered  as public  procurement. 
However,  it would  be misleading  to consider  the  activities of  a  firm 
like SIF',  which  is a  licensee by  the government,  is  organized  into 
a  state holding  group  <STET>  and  is the largest  buyer  of  the sector, 
as purely private operations  <Pontarollo  <1983)). 
SIP's purchasing  system is based  on  a  Memorandum,  released at the 
beginning  of  every  year,  which  includes the plan  of  the total  value of 
annual  purchases and  an  updating  of  the price level.  In  its purchasing 
policy SIP  has  gener·all y  r·espected  the  "historical  market  shar·es" 
principle.  This  kind  of  behaviour  has  been  favoured  both  by  structural 
characteristics of  the industry and  by  technological  characteristics 
of  the  products.  In  relation  to  the  former,  the  monopsonistic 
structure of  the industry,  together  with  the right  of  the monopsonist 
to  set  technical  sta~dards,  ~reates an  incentive  towards  collusion 
among  the  producers  to  riequilibrate  the  balance  of  power.  Also 
technological  factors  have  favoured  a  stable  relationship  between  the 
suppliers and  the buyer;  electromechanical  switches,  for  example,  are 
usually installed for  a  given  capacity,  which  can  be  increased at 
decreasing  costs.  As  a  consequence,  once  the original  contract is 
assigned  to a  firm,  the works  of  expansion  are assigned  to  the same 
firm. 
An  important  feature of  SIP's  attitude  has  been  the constant 
attention  to  the  evolution  of  ltaltel,  which  is  a  manufacturer· 
belonging  to the same  state holding  as SIP.  An  example  is the decision -®-
by  SIP  to  slow  down  the  conve~sion  of  the  netwo~k  f~om 
el.ect~omechanical to  elect~onic  technology,  waiting  for  ltaltel  to 
p~oduce its own  system.  In  fact  Italtel  <which  has  the  la~gest market 
sha~e fo~ public  switches)  was  ~athe~ slow  in  developing  the  necessa~y 
skills fo~ the  elect~onic technology  in  public  switches. 
The  second  largest  buyer  in  Italy is ASST.  Diffe~ently from  SIP, 
it is required  by  law  to call  for  competitive  tende~s  for  the supply 
of  telecom equipment  and  systems.  Usually,  the  invitation to tenders 
is  made  to  companies operating  in  Italy.  However,  this  kind  of 
protection  has  not  been  accompanied  in  Italy,  differently  f~om other 
countries,  by  the elaboration  of  detailed  technical  standards. 
J.  Some  characteristics of  industry structure and  performance 
3.1.  Dimension:  plants and  firms 
Table  shows  the evolution  of  plant  size  distribution  between 
1971  and  1981.  During  this  period  there has  been  a  reduction  in 
average plant  dimension  (from  153.1  to  105.4  employees>.  In  terms  of 
size distribution  the largest relative decrease  can  be observed  in  the 
highest  dimensional  class,  while the largest relative increase is for 
plants of  200  to 499  employees. 
This  evolution is  a  sign  of  the restructuring  in  the  industry 
following  the progressive  introduction  of  new  technologies which  are 
less  labour  intensive  (for  example  the  passage  from  the 
electromechanical  to the electronic technology  in  public  switches>. 
In  relation  to  economies  of  scale at  the plant  level,  recent 
estimates  repo~ted in  the survey paper  by  Pratten  <1987>  show  how  the 
increase in  unit  costs below  minimum  efficient scale  <MES>  for  the -50-
production  of  exchanges are  not  very  high  (5-101  at  1/3  MES  in  West 
Germany  and  4.51  at  1/2  MES  in  the  United  Kingdom>.  At  a  more 
qualitative level,  it has  been  suggested  that until  recently  "because 
the processes  involved  assembling  a  large  number  of  component  parts to 
produce  the  final  product,  the  design  and  organization  of  the 
manufacturing  and  assembly  process  may  have  improved  as cumulative 
output  increased,  so  that  unit  costs  declined  with  scale  of 
production••  <DECO,  1983  pg.34).  The  technological  evolution  which  has 
characterized  almost  all  product  segments  of  this  sector,  has shifted 
the  main  source  of  economies  of  scale at  the  firm  level  to R-D 
activities.  The  evolution  of  R-D  expenditures has  been  characterized 
by  the strong  increase  in  fixed  investments for  the acquisition of  the 
basic  principles of  the  new  technology  and  by  the necessity to pr·oduce 
continuous  and  sistematic  innovations 
tr·a.jector· i es. 
along  given  technological 
The  introduction  of  new  technologies  has started  in different 
countries at  different periods.  For  example,  West  Germany  and  Italy 
are clearly latecomers  in  the  introduction  of  electronic technology  in 
public  switches,  when  compared  to France,  the United  Kingdom  and  the 
United  States  <Table  2>. 
As  a  consequence,  an  international  comparison  of  firm  dimension 
should  be  interpreted  taking  into  ~onsideration  these elements.  The 
fact  that  in  1981  average firm  dimension  was  in  Italy  and  West 
Germany,  higher  than  in  the United  Kingdom  and  in  France  <Table  3>,  is 
partly explained  by  the delay  in  the substitution of  electromechanical 
(more  labour-intensive>  with  semielectronic  and  digital  technologies 
in  the former  countries. -51-
3.2.  Concent~ation 
In  the  p~oduction  of  public  switches,  Italy has  an  anomalous 
supply  structure characterized  by  a  high  number  of  manufacturers 
relatively to domestic  market  dimension  <Table  4>  <1>. 
In  1984,  ltaltel  (part  of  the state holding  IRI-STET>  had  a 
market  share of  50.3%,  Telettra  <part  of  the  FIAT  gr·oup>  had  2.6%,  GTE 
Italy  (Siemens>  had  12.61,  Face  <Alcatel  Nv>  had  14.21 and  Fatme 
<Ericsson>  had  20.3%.  It  can  be also observed  how  market  shares of  the 
five  firms  fluctuated  only marginally during  the last  ten  years;  this 
evidence  is  in  1 i ne  with  the al r·eady  discussed 
11hi  sto~i  cal  mar·ket 
shares"  principle. 
Evidence  on  the fragmentation  of  Italian  industry  of  public 
switches relatively to that  of  other countries,  is presented  in  Table 
5.  Italy is the only country  having  four  suppliers,  each  one  with  a 
share of  mo~e than  10%  of  the market.  Moreover,  in  Italy the producers 
offer  th~ee different  switching  systems  <UT,  Axe,  1240>,  while  in  most 
other  European  countries only  two  switching  systems are allowed. 
This situation is in  evolution  because of  the decision  in  1982  by 
CIPE  (the government  Committee  for  Economic  Planning>  to reduce  the 
number  of  suppl i er·s  of  digital  switches  to  two.  As  a  consea•-'ence, 
Italtel,  GTE  and  Telettra  decided  to  set  up  the so-called National 
Pole  for  the  unification  and  development  of  switching  systems. 
Successively,  Italtel  and  Telettra decided  a  process  of  merger  with 
the  creation  of  a  new  company,  Telit;  the agreement  collapsed  in 
November·  1987. 
Whenever  the  reduction  to  two  switching  systems  should  take 
place,  either  Fatme  of  Face  would  be  the second  supplie~.  The  result 
would  depend  on  the configuration of  the  international  agreements -52-
concluded  by  the National  Pole.  What  is  ce~tain, neither  wants  to exit 
f~om the  ma~ket.  Actually,  both  of  them  are  ope~ating  with  mo~e 
manpower  than  is really  ~equi~ed;  the aim  of  this behaviour  is partly 
linked  to the desire to maintain  thei~ bargaining  power. 
A fu~the~ element  revealed  by  Table  5  is the  strong penetration 
of  foreign  capital  in  Italy in  comparison  to what  has  happened  in 
countries  like  France,  West  Germany  and  the United  Kingdom.  Rather 
than  a  signal  of  openness,  it  is  the  result  of  the 
technological  backwardness  of  the  countr·y. 
The  market  for  transmission  equipment  is  characterized  by  a 
similar  fragmentation  on  the supply side,  but  this  is not  anomalous 
with  respect  to the experience  of  other countries. 
The  largest supplier  is Telettra  (341  of  the  ma~ket>  followed  by 
'II 
Italtel  <24%>  and  GTE  <15%)  <Table  b).  In  compar·ison  to public 
switches there is a  new  large  supplie~:  the  B~itish company,  Ma~coni 
<10%>.  Also  in  this  market  there is  a  large  presence  of  foreign 
capital. 
In  terms  of  the  attitude  of  SIP  towards  Italtel,  it  is 
interesting  to  compare  data  for  the  whole  market  of  t~ansmission 
equipment  in  Table  b  with  data referred  to that  portion  of  the  market 
generated  by  SIP purchases  <Table  7).  It is evident  how  larger is the 
share of  the latter  market  detained  by  Italtel. 
For  the terminal  equipment  market,  indications are similar  to 
those for  the previous markets  in  terms  of  fragmentation  and  the 
presence of  foreign  companies.  The  evidence  in  1985 for  three products 
of  this segment  of  the  industry is presented  in  Table  B. -53-
3.3.  Foreign  trade 
Telecommunication  industry  is characterized by  a  positive trade 
balance  <Table  9).  This result is in  1  i ne  to what  happens  in  other· 
countries  with  the  notable  exception  of  the  United  States 
<Cozzi-Genco,  1987>. 
Disaggregating  the  flows  of  international  trade  by  area of 
origin  and  destination,  it can  be observed  that  the origin  of  Italian 
trade surplus is due  to the high  surplus with  non-Deed  countries which 
more  than  compensates for  the deficit with  Deed-countries  <Table  10). 
A final  useful  information  can  be  obtained  from  Table  11:  export 
intensity for  the whole  industry  (defined  by  the.ratio of  the value  of 
e:·~ports to  the value of  .production)  has  been  around  201  during  the 
period  1980-1984.  Import  penetration  during  the  same  period  has 
fluctutated  between  121  and  14.51.  However,  when  we  consider  data at 
the  firm  level,  we  can  observe  very  disparate  performances:  for 
example,  ltaltel  has  a  very  low  export  intensity  <around  61>,  while 
Telettra has  a  very  strong  exposure  to  international  competition 
<export  intensity is more  than  501>. 
4.  Final  comments 
The  completion  of  the  internal  market  will  affect  the 
telecommunication  industry,  mainly  in  opening  up  competition  in  the 
public  procurement  area  and  in  the  homogeneization  of  technical 
standards. -54-
These  measures  imply  an  enlargement  of  the  market  actually facing 
the firm.  Given  the existence of  scale economies,  particularly in  R-D 
activities,  this  evolution  should  bring  about  an  increase  in 
efficiency at  the  EEC  level. 
Moreover,  integration  can  have  two  other  positive effects at  the 
EEC  level  <2>.  The  first effect relates to  allocative efficiency;  it 
is likely that  the passage  from  a  protected to a  liberalized situation 
will  increase competition. 
Secondly,  the completion  of  the  internal  market  can  be also 
interpreted as  a  strategic trade policy  (defined  as a  policy  "aimed  at 
securing  national  advantage  in  oligopolistic industries  ..  >  at  the  EEC 
level.  In  fact,  additional  benefits  can  be  obtained  by  the 
strengthening  of  the competitiveness of  European  firms  vis-a-vis  US 
and  Japanese rivals. 
The  liberalization  of  the  telecommunication  market  is  also 
favour·ed  by  the autonomous  evolution  of  the  industry.  The  distribution 
of  world  demand  between  systems  and  equipments for  public  networks  and 
private systems  and  terminals should  gradually shift  in  favour  of  the 
latter.  According  to  Dataquest  in  the period  1986-1990 the average 
incidence of  private systems  and  terminals  will  be  37.41;  it will 
increase to 44.91  during  the period  1991-1995 and  to 55.11 during  the 
period  1996-2000. 
This  means  a  shift  towards  a  segment  which  is  already 
characterized  by  a  high  degree of  liberalization. -55-
The  evolution  in  Italy is similar to the one  for  the world  as far 
as the general  tendency is concerned.  However·,  public  switches,  while 
losing  some  ground,  should  maintain  the largest  share of  the market  in 
the  next  ten  years.  This  is  mainly  due  to  overlapping  between 
additional  demand  <which  is far  from  saturation)  and  renewal  demand. 
Considering  the effects of  the completion  of  the  internal  markP~ 
at  the  Italian  level  a  clear  benefit  will  arise from  the increase  in 
competition. 
However,  one  important  element  to  consider  is  the ability of 
Italian  firms  to  survive  international  competition.  In  fact,  the 
tel  ecommuni cation  industry  can  be  considered  a  "strategic  sector·" 
because  of  the generation  of  external  economies  mainly  via spillover 
effects of  R-D  activities. 
As  we  have  already seen,  some  Italian firms  are already competing 
successfully in  some  segment  of  the industry  (for  example,  Telettra in 
transmission  equipment>;  other  firms,  on  the contrary,  have  had  a 
very  low  exposure  to  international  competition  because  of  the 
protection  they  received.  However,  it is difficult to draw  conclusions 
on  this  point  because of  the fast  evolution  in  the oligopolistic 
configuration  of  the  industry at the world  level. -56-
(1)  Data  in  Table 4  are relative to purchases by  SIP  which  is the 
largest  buyer.  The  remaining  part  of  demand  is covered  by  ASST 
<150  bn  lire in  1984)  and  by  Italcable. 
<2>  -Krugman  (1986>. -57-
Tab.  1  - Man.  of  telecomm.  equipment,  electrical  and  electronis equipment 
(Nace  344.2)  - Size distribution:  plants and  firms 
1971  1981 
---------------------------- -----------------~-----------
Employees  Plants  Employees  Plants 
N.  I  N.  I  N.  I  N.  I 
1  - 5  254  .6  99  37.2  477  .I:)  202  36.5 
6  - 9  238  .6  32  12  489  .8  68  12.3 
10-19  606  1. 5  43  16.2  1188  2.0  88  15.9 
20-49  1162  2.8  36  13.5  2156  3.7  70  12.7 
50-99  1336  3.3  18  6.8  2957  5.1  41  7.4 
100-199  2546  6.2  17  6.4  4650  8.0  33  6.0 
200-499  1874  4.6  6  2.3  8503  14.6  28  5.1 
500-999  4013  9.8  5  1.9  5340  9.2  9  1. 6 
more  than  1000  28692  70.4  10  3.8  32530  55.8  14  2.5 
TOTAL  40721  266  58290  553 
M=  153.1  M=105.4 
1971 
-----------------------------
Employees  Firms  Employees  Fir·ms 
N.  I  N.  I  N.  I  N.  I 
1  - 5  221  .5  84  38.5  400  .7  172  43.4 
6  - 9  201  .4  27  12.4  383  .7  54  13.6 
10-19  527  1. 2  37  17.0  830  1. 5  61  15.4 
20-49  936  2.1  30  13.8  1347  2.4  43  10.9 
50-99  1152  2.6  15  6.9  1621  2.8  23  5.8 
100-199  2188  4.9  15  6.9  3031  5.3  21  5.3 
200-499  359  .8  1  .6  4642  8.2  14  3.5 
500-999  2583  5.7  4  1.8  784  1.4  1  .2 
more  than  1000  36727  81.8  5  2.3  43750  77.0  7  1. 8 
TOTAL  44894  218  56788  396 
M =  205.9  t1=143.4 
M =  aver·age  plant size 
Source  :  ISTAT,  Census -58-
Tab.  2  - Shares  of  switching  technologies  <1  January  1985) 
Technology  Italy  France  United  West  Usa 
Kingdom  Germany 
Electromechanical  96  63  79 
Semi-electronic  1  15  20 
Electronic  (digital)  3  22  1 
Total  100  100  100 
Source  I tal tel 
Tab.  3  - Man.  of  telecomm.  equipment,  electrical  and 
electronic  equipment  - 1981 
97 
2 
1 
100 
International  comparison  of  firm  size distribution 
Employees 
mor·e 
20-99  100-499  than  500  Total  M 
%  %  I  number· 
Italy  5.3  13.8  80.9  59035  493.9 
West  Ger·ma.ny  4.6  10.6  84.8  358398  613.7 
France  12.4  15.3  72.3  105239  257.9 
United  Kingdom  6.4  21.3  72.2  228820  370.3 
Denmark  13.6  33.2  53.2  12289  204.8 
Firms 
Italy  57.4  34.4  8.2  122 
West  Ber·many  60.3  28.9  10.8  584 
France  73.3  19.9  6.9  408 
United  Kingdom  50.8  34.5  14.7  618 
Denmark  61.7  28.3  10.0  60 
Note:  M = average firm size 
Source . Eur·ostat  . 
38 
50 
12 
100 -59-
Tab.  4  - Public  switches:  shares of  the market  generated 
by  SIP's purchases 
(bn.lira) 
ITALTEL  IT  179.4 
TELETTRA  IT  .3 
GTE  D  30.5 
FACE  F  55.6 
FAT ME  sw  60.5 
TOTAL  326.0 
Other·s  34.6 
TOTAL  360.9 
Sour·ce  SIP 
1976 
55.0 
• 1 
9.4 
7.0 
18.5 
90.4 
9.6 
100.0 
1984 
(bn.lira> 
609.2 
32.1 
53.0 
171.3 
246.3 
1211.9 
246.9 
1458.8 
50.3 
2.6 
12.6 
14.2 
20.3 
83.1 
16.9 
100.0 -60-
Tab.  5  - European  market  in  public  switches. 
Market  shares - 1987 
Country 
Austria 
Belgium 
Danemar·k 
EIRE 
Finland 
Fr·ance 
Gr·eece 
Italy 
Nether· I ands 
Nor· way 
Por·tugal 
Spain 
Sweden 
Swi b::erland 
United  Kingdom 
West  Ger·many 
Europe 
Siemens  Ericsson  Alcatel 
NV 
26.3  26.3 
20.0  80.0 
38.9  50.0  11. 1 
50.0  so.·o 
27.8  27.8 
85.2 
40.7 
11.4  19.0  14.3 
19.4  13.9 
42.9  57.1 
50.0  50.0 
29.6  70.4 
88.5 
33.3  33.3  33.3 
16.2 
75. 1  24.8 
20.0  15.0  35.0 
Sour·ce  our·  el abor-a.t ion  fr·om  Zanetti  ( 1987) 
Plessey  Italtel  ATT/ 
and  SEC  Philips 
--
18.5 
55.2 
66.6 
68.4 
10.0  7.0  3.0 -61-
Tab.  6  - Distribution of  Italian market  for 
Transmission  Equipment  (excluding 
mobile radio)  - 1984 
Telettr·a 
Italtel 
GTE 
Marconi 
Face 
Fat  me 
SIAE 
Selenia 
Philips 
Source  Estimates  by  Telettra 
34 
24 
15 
8 
2-3 
3-4 
2 
less than  2 
3-4 
Tab.  7  - Distribution of  the market  generated  by  SIP 
purchases of  transmission  equipment  - 1984 
Telettra  35 
Italtel  33 
Marconi  17 
GTE  11 
Fatme  2 
Selenia  2 
Source  estimates by  Telettra -62-
Tab.  8  - Distribution of  italian market  for 
terminal  equipment  - 1985 
Telephones  Modems 
Sales 
(bn.  1 ira>  170  54 
Market  shares 
(I) 
Italtel  40  Are 
Face  20  Motorola 
Fat  me  10  Italtel 
Others  30  IBM 
Philips 
Others 
Source  Zanetti  (1987> 
31.2 
20.6 
18.8 
9.4 
6.5 
13.5 
Tab.  9  - Foreign  trade and  production  (bn  lira) 
1980  1981  1982  1983 
Production  1577  2041  2593  3094 
Impor·t  214  231  294  3480 
Expor·t  317  366  561  576 
Trade  Balance  103  135  267  228 
Source  :  Campo  dall'Orto-Mariotti  <1986) 
PBX 
380 
Italtel  32.2 
Safnat  13.0 
Fat  me  11.8 
Telettra  7.2 
Olivetti  6.8 
GTE  5.1 
Face  3.9 
Others  20.0 
1984  1985 
3733 
464  544 
628  756 
164  211 -63-
Tab.  10  - Italian foreign  trade  in  TLC  narrowly defined 
<SITC  7648>  and  broadly defined  <SITC  764> 
<  m  i 11 i on  S >  •  1985 
SITC  764 
Import  Export  <X-M> 
World  598  831  233 
OECD  533  347  -186 
EEC  252  184  -68 
NON-OECD  59  484  425 
Source  DECO  Series B 
T4b.  11  - Italian export  intensity and 
import  penetration 
SITC  7648 
Import  Export 
105  229 
93  34 
41  12 
11  195 
-----~~~~~-------------~--------------------------------
1980  1981  1982  1983  1984 
Expor·t 
Intensity  20.1  17.9  21.6  20.5  17.6 
Impor·t · 
PenetratiQn  14.5  12. 1  12.6  12.4  13.0 
Source  Elaborations from  Tab.  9 
(X-M> 
124 
-59 
-29 
184 -64-
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Railways  equipment 
1.  Introduction 
Until  1985,  app~oximately  4/5  of  the demand  facing  the  fi~ms 
operating  in  this  secto~ was  due  to  Fe~~ovie delle State  CF.S.,  the 
gove~nment owned  railway  company). 
If  we  partition the  secto~,  on  one  side,  in  te~ms  of  the 
functional  and  technological  char·acte~i sti  cs  of  the  p~oducts 
<mechanical  and  elect~ical>  and,  on  the  othe~ side,  in  te~ms of  type 
of  utilization of  the  p~oduct  <heavy  and  light>,  we  observe  <Table  1) 
that  the  largest  pa~t of  the market  is covered  by  the  heavy  segment. 
The  demand  for  this  p~oduct is almost  enti~ely due  to F.S. 
This  cha~acteristic has strongly shaped  Italian  indust~y.  No  fi~m 
in  this  industry  was  born  or  has  developed  independently  f~om the 
demand  of  F.S.  Various  elements characterize this dependence  from  F.S. 
First,  F.S.'s purchasing  decisions are linked  to the financing 
laws  approved  by  the  Parliament.  This  has  c~eated uncertainties 
surrounding  both  the  timing  and  dimension  of  demand.  As  a  consequence, 
the  industry  has  suffered  periods  of  excess capacity  (on  average  in 
the last few  years utilization has  been  around  701  of  total  capacity>. 
Second,  firms  had  F.S.  as  thei~ main  point  of  reference for  the 
development  of  indust~ial  p~oducts.  Moreover,  F.S.  had,  especially in 
the past,  an  active  ~ole  in  project  formulation  and  development  of 
products  with  the consequence  of  not  stimulating  autonomous  innovative 
ability in  the firms. -~-
A  final  element  is  the  high  protection  gua~anteed  by  public 
procurement.  To  each  tender  only  those firms  recognized  as official 
suppliers of  F.S.  are admitted  •  This  guarantees  a  p~otection from  new 
entries in  the industry.  Moreover,  this is reinforced  by  the existence 
of  historical  shares  on  the  basi~ of  which  the purchasing  orders are 
partitioned. 
2.  Fragmentation  and  international  competitiveness 
This  situation  has  favoured  the  shaping  of  an  industry 
characterized  by  a  high  degree  of  fragmentation  and  a  law  ability of 
competition  on  international  markets. 
In  relation  to  fragmentation,  Table  1  shows  the  size 
distribution.  In  1981  the representative plant  had  633.2 employees; 
and  the representative firm  had  715.0.  Between  1971  and  1981  th~re has 
been  a  strong  increase  in  dimension:  representative  plant  size 
increased  by  78.8%  and  representative firm size  increased  by  51%. 
Similar  indications arise when  we  consider  average size of  the  la~gest 
plants  (firms>  employin~ 501  of  employees. 
Notwithstanding  this  increase  in  dimension,  in  1981  Italian 
industry was  still  more  fragmented  than  the one  in  the other  major 
countries in  the  EEC.  Infact,  Table  2  shows  that  in  1981  the average 
dimension  of  firms  with  more  than  20  employees  was  smaller  than  in 
France,  in  West  Germany  and  in  the United  Kingdom. -67-
The  public sector is strongly involved  in this sector also on  the 
supply side.  Two  state holding  groups operate  in  this sector:  EFIM  and 
IRI.  The  former  is  mainly  involved  in  products characterized  by 
mechanical  technology,  the  latter  in  products  of  electrical 
technology,  diesel  engines and  steel  products. 
To  understand  the role played  by  the firms  belonging  to  public 
groups,  it is useful  to analyze the distribution  of  employment  among 
the firms  in  the various  segment  of  the  industry characterized  by  the 
different  technological  feature  of  the product. 
Table  3  shows  the employment  distribution  among  groups supplying 
products  characterized  by  the mechanical  technology.  The  EFIM  group 
has  the  largest share of  blue collars  in this segment  (26.21)  and  it 
is followed  by  the private group  FIREMA  <21.1S).  The  only  presence of 
foreign  capital  is represented  by  Brown  Boweri  with  1.31 of  total  blue 
call  ar·s. 
In  the electric-traction segment  the largest  share is held  by  IRI 
<43.7%  of  total  blue  collars>,  followed  by  Brown  Boweri  with  19.2% 
CT ab 1 e  4 >. 
in  the  segment  characterized  by  fixed  electrical 
installations,  the highest  concentration  of  blue collars is in  the  IRI 
group  <35.9%),  followed  by  foreign  groups  like  Brown  Boweri  and 
Er·1csson  (11.3,;  and  11.8%  respectively)  <Table  5). 
The  last  thre~ tables show  a  strong  presence  of  the public sector 
on  the supply side. 
The  degree  of  concentration  is lower  than  in  other countries. 
Only  one  segment  of  the  industry shows  a  four-firm concentration ratio 
comp.:tr·c3.b 1 e  to  the one  prevai 1 i ng  in  other·  countries  (about  901): 
products  based  on  electrical-traction technology.  Other  segments  have -68-
lower  degrees  of  concentration:  both  production  of  electrical  fixed 
installations and  production  of  mechanical-traction products  show  a 
four-firm  concentration ratio at  about  70%.  In  France,  for  example, 
the least concentrated  segment  shows  a  four-firm  concentration ratio 
of  about  85%. 
The  exposure  to international  markets  of  Italian  firms is very 
low:  in  1982  the ratio of  exports on  sales was  5.1%  (Table 6). 
The  low  competitiveness of  Italian firms  on  international  markets 
is presented  in  Table  7:  Italy has  the lowest  share in  the exports of 
the largest  producing  countries  (3.5%  in  the period  1973-77  and  4.4% 
in  the period  1979-83>.  Moreover  a  low  export  market  share  is also 
characteristic of  most  of  the products  in this sector  <Table  8). 
The  results of  a  research  cited  in  Mercurio  (1985>,  analyzing  the 
differences  in  the  determinants  of  good  performance  on  the domestic 
and  on  the  international  market,  show  that the differences are linked 
to the divergent  characteristics  of  a  closed  and  protected  market 
relatively  to  an  open  market.  These  divergences characterize the 
reailway equipment  sector  in  all  industrialized  countries  with  an 
autonomous  domestic  industry.  Moreover,  in  Italy,  differently from  the 
other  countries,  the special  kind  of  relationship existing  between  the 
demand  and  the supply  side  of  the  market  have  reduced  the firms' 
ability to compete  on  international  markets.  For  example,  as  already 
mentioned,  autonomous  innovative ability has  never  been  stimulated  by 
F.S  ••  An  indirect  indication  of  the protection  of  the domestic  market 
is presented  in  Table 6.  In  fact,  from  the inability,  on  average,  of 
Italian firms  to compete at  an  international  level,  one  should  expect a  strong  penetration of  imports  on  the domestic  market.  However,  this 
is  not  the  case:  in  1982  imports  were  only  2.8S  of  domestic 
disappearance. 
Moreover,  foreign  production  is represented  with  a  significative 
market  share only  by  Brown  Boveri  in  the traction  segments  of  the 
industry  <Tables  3  and  4).  In  the  electrical  fixed  installations 
segment  of  the  industry,  there  is  a  strong  presence  of  foreign 
production. 
The  synthetic  discussion  of  the  industry  presented  in  the 
previous  sections  has  underlied  the  fragmentation 
international  competitiveness of  the  Italian  industry. 
The  completion  of  the internal  market  can  have positive effects 
because  of  the enlargement  of  the market  actually facing  the firm  and 
the consequent  better exploitation of  economies  of  scale. 
However,  since the  increase  in  competition  will  also have  the 
effect  of  marginalize the inefficient producers,  one  should  also ask 
whether  Italian firms  will  be able to survive  foreign  competition.  We 
have  already noted  that  the exposure  to foreign  competition  has  been 
on  average  very  low. 
However·,  the  indication at  the firm  level  are  less pessimistic. 
An  example is given  by  Breda  whose  share of  exports on  sales  has  been 
around  25%  in  the last  few  years.  Moreover,  an  analysis  of  the 
strategies of  the leaders in  the two  segments  of  this industry  Ci.e. 
Breda  and  Ansaldo>,  shows  that  they are oriented  towards  international 
competition  <Mercurio  (1987>>. -m-
Even  if  these elements  don't  provide  a  clearcut  answer  to the 
original  question,  it  is  possible  to  say  that  a  progress1v~ 
liberalization  of  European  markets  will  reduce  the  degree  of 
fragmentation  of  the  Italian  industry  and  offer  Italian  firms  the 
opportunity of  a  better exploitation  of  scale  economies. -71-
Tab.  1  - Percentage distribution of  the market  according 
to its segments  : 
Heavy 
Tr·action 
Light 
Tr·action  Total 
Mechanical  61  3  64 
Electr·ical  29  7  36 
- Tr·acti on  19  2  21 
- Fixed  installation  10  5  15 
Totc:l.l  90  10  100 
Sour·ce  Mer·curi o  < 1987) -72-
Tab.  2 - Manufacture  of  railway  equipment  <NACE  362) 
Size distributions . plants and  firms  . 
------------------------------------------------------------------------
1971  1981 
------------------------- ---------------------------
Employees  Plants  Employees  Plants 
N.  s  N.  s  N.  I  N.  I 
1  - 5  53  .3  16  15.6  56  .2  23  18.1 
6  - 9  77  .5  10  9.7  84  .3  11  8.7 
10-19  323  2.2  23  22.3  146  .5  11  8.7 
20-49  478  3.2  14  13.6  564  2.0  18  14.2 
50-99  503  3.4  7  6.8  636  2.3  10  7.9 
100-199  1282  8.6  9  8.7  1787  6.5  12  9.4 
200-499  5750  38.6  16  15.5  7284  26.4  21  16.5 
500-999  4662  31.3  7  6.8  12213  44.2  17  13.4 
mor·e  than  1000  1776  11.9  1  1.0  4863  17.6  4  3. 1 
TOTAL  14904  103  27633  127 
M=144.7  Me=354.1  Top  50%=475.2  M=217.6  Me=633.2  Top50%=842.5 
1971  1981 
------------------------- ---------------------------
Employees  Fi r·ms  Employees  Fi r·ms 
N.  %  N.  %  N.  %  N.  I 
1 - 5  30  .3  7  10.3  25  • 1  9  12.5 
6  - 9  43  .4  6  8.8  61  .3  8  11. 1 
10-19  249  2. 1  18  26.5  134  .9  10  13.9 
20-49  402  3.5  11  16.2  396  2.3  13  18.0 
50-99  340  2.  c;·  5  7.3  327  1. 9  5  6.9 
100-199  119  1. 0  1  1.5  496  2.8  3  4.2 
200-499  4711  40.7  13  19.1  4052  23.3  11  15.3 
500-999  4582  39.6  6  8.8  7430  42.7  10  13.9 
mor·e  than  1000  1083  9.4  1  1.5  4463  25.7  3  4.2 
TOTAL  11559  68  17384  72 
M=169.9  Me=491.6  Top  501=791. 7  M=241. 4  Me=715.0  Top501=999.1 
Sour·ce . !STAT,  Census  . -73-
Tab.  3  - Manufacture of  railway equipment  CNACE  362) 
International  comparison  of  firm size distribution:  1981 
Di str·i buti  on  of  Employment  by  Firm Size 
20-99  100-499 
I  " 
Italy  4.9  25.7 
West  Germany  n.a  n.a 
France  6.1  27.4 
United  Kingdom  1.7  5.0 
Distribution 
Italy  40.0  31.1 
West  Ger·many  n.a  n.a 
France  43.2  36.4 
United  Kingdom  47.2  33.3 
Note:  M = average for  firm size 
Source  :  EUROSTAT 
more  than  500  TOT 
" 
N. 
69.4  15906 
n.a  11270 
66.5  16624 
93.2  46509 
of  Firms  by  Size 
28.9  45 
n.a  25 
20.5  44 
19.4  36 
Tab.  4  - Products characterized  by  mechanical  technology 
Share  of  total  employment 
Employees  Blue call  ar·s 
"  " 
EFIM  25.6  26.2 
IRI  2.5  2.3 
FIAT  11. 1  8.1 
FIREMA  22.5  21.1 
BROWN  BDVERI  1. 4  1. 3 
OTHERS  36.5  40.8 
Composition  of  varions groups  : 
M 
353.5 
450.8 
377.8 
1291.9 
EFIM  Breda  C.F.,  Imesi,  Safer,  Omeca,  Ferrosud,  Officine Reggiane 
IRI  Isotta Fraschini 
FIAT  Fiat Ferroviaria Sav1gliano 
FIREMA  :  Officine Fiore,  OMC,  Officine Stanga,  Officine Cittadella, 
Officine Casaralta 
BROWN  BOVERI  :  Tecnomasio  Italiano Brown  Boveri 
Sour·ce  Mer· cur· i o  ( 1987> -74-
Tab.  5  - Products characterized  by electrical  technology 
<tractian>.  Share  of  total  employment 
Employees  Blue cell  ar·s 
I  ' 
IRI  57.0  43.7 
BROWN  BDVERI  11.0  19.2 
FIREMA  19.3  15.6 
FIAT-PARIZZI  7.8  8.3 
OTHERS  4.9  13.2 
Composition  of  varions groups 
IRI  :  Ansaldo  Trasporti 
BROWN  BOVERI  :  Tecnomasio  Italiano Brown  Boveri 
FIREMA  Ercole Marelli  Trazione,  Metalmeccanica  Lucana 
FIAT  :  Elettromeccanica Parizzi 
Source  Mercurio  <1987> 
Tab.  6  - Electrical  fixed  installations 
Share  of  total  employment 
IRI 
BROWN  BOVERI 
ERICSSON 
ITT 
CIR 
WESTINGHOUSE 
OTHERS 
Employees 
% 
40.6 
12.3 
8.7 
8.0 
3.4 
15.9 
11. 1 
Composition  of  varions  groups 
IRI  :  Ansaldo  Trasporti 
Blue collars 
% 
35.9 
11.3 
11.8 
9.3 
4.5 
10.2 
17.0 
BROWN  BOVERI  :  Tecnomasio  Italiano Brown  Boveri,  S.A.E. 
ERICSSON-SETEMER:  Fatme,  Scarpini,  Sielte 
ITT  :  Siette,  Parisini 
CIR  :  Sasib 
WESTINGHOUSE  :  Wabco  Westinghouse  Segnali 
Source  Mercurio  <1987) -75-
Tab.  7  - Exposure to international  competition 
Export 
intensity 
Import 
penetration 
1981 
1982 
8.0 
5.1 
Sou~ce :  ou~ elaboration  on  data from  ISTAT 
Tab.  8  - Share  in  the export  of  the  9  largest 
producing  countries 
Italy 
Fr·ance 
West  Ger·many 
United  Kingdom 
USA 
Canada 
Japan 
TOTAL 
aver· age 
1973-77 
3.5 
24.9 
16.4 
4.3 
24.0 
5.0 
21.9 
100 
Sour·ce  ONU  cited  in  Mercurio  <1987> 
4.1 
2.8 
average 
1979-83 
4.4 
19.8 
18.3 
10.1 
14.7 
10.1 
22.6 
100 -76-
Tab.  9 - Export  aarket  share  of  the  principal  European  exporting  countrits 
(average  for  years  1975-81) 
&eraany 
France 
S•itzerland 
Austria 
Total 
Italy 
Others 
Electrical  Parts  of  Other 
lacaaative  locoaotive  locoaotives 
18.5 
27.7 
27.0 
83.2 
1.0 
15.8 
37.7 
17.4 
6.4 
2.8 
64.3 
3.4 
32.4 
40.9 
7.0 
2.6 
50.5 
2.2 
47.3 
Source:  OCDE,  cited  in  "ercurio  (1985) 
Passengers 
rail•ay-
cars 
17.4 
0.6 
0.1 
0.1 
18.2 
1.5 
80.3 
Freight  Markshop 
car 
30.0 
45.3 
4.4 
0.9 
80.6 
1.4 
18.0 
ur and 
rail•ay 
equipaent 
11.4 
3.1 
18.7 
38.7 
71.9 
9.3 
18.8 
Signal 
instal-
lations 
28.7 
15.9 
8.3 
5.2 
58.1 
1.4 
40.5 -77-
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